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Abstract. Existing models of life-cycle demand typically relate household welfare
to the scale of total consumption expenditures, deflated by a price index. This is only
correct if preferences are homothetic and expenditure shares for particular goods
within a period are fixed, and is sharply at odds with strong empirical evidence,
including Engel’s Law. Instead of using the scale of total expenditures we show how
to exploit variation in the composition of a household’s consumption portfolio to
estimate demand systems that are flexible and may feature highly non-linear Engel
curves. This same procedure yields an index of household welfare closely related to
the marginal utility of expenditures within a period. We use these methods with
repeated cross-sectional expenditure surveys from Uganda to estimate an incomplete
demand system and household welfare in different periods, and analyze the effects of
shocks such as the 2008 food price crisis on welfare in Uganda. Our results contrast
sharply with those obtained using total ‘real’ expenditures, which cannot capture
the differential impact of increased food prices across the expenditure distribution.
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Measures of household or individual-level consumption expenditures are central to
the construction of policy-relevant statistics such as poverty rates in most low income
countries, and are also critical inputs to a wide variety of important research ques-
tions in many fields of economics, particularly in models involving risk, inequality, or
life-cycle behavior (e.g., Angelucci and Giorgi 2009; Lise and Yamada 2017).1 The
household surveys used to collect these data almost invariably record disaggregate
expenditures; that is, expenditures on many different kinds of goods or services. How-
ever, empirical work employing these data to measure changes in household welfare
typically focuses on the sum of these disaggregate expenditures, divided by a price
index, or total real household consumption expenditures.2 Total real consumption
expenditures give us the scale of the household’s consumption, but tells us nothing
about the composition of the household’s consumption portfolio. The question of
this paper: How can information on the composition of the consumption portfolio be
exploited to measure households’ material well-being?
To answer this question we introduce two main innovations. The first is to devise
a new incomplete demand system which allows for variation in both the scale and
composition of households’ consumption portfolios to flexibly arise from changes in
prices or households’ budgets. Its form is uniquely determined by the requirement
that it must be possible to infer a relative measure of well-being for one household
by observing its consumptions relative to a second similar household, a property
we call “Conditionally Independent Relative Consumptions for Similar Households”
(CIRCSH). The second innovation is the construction of a simple estimator of this de-
mand system which allows us to recover not only critical demand elasticities, but also
household-specific latent variables which we show can be interpreted as the household-
specific multipliers (λ) associated with households’ within-period budget constraints.
We show that a globally regular demand system will have (some) goods satisfying
CIRCSH if and only if demands for those goods take a particular form we call Constant
Frisch Elasticity (CFE). Aside from allowing us to draw inferences regarding welfare
measures λ, this system has unrestricted rank (in the sense of Lewbel 1991), and can
be shown to nest most of the globally regular demand systems commonly encountered
in the empirical literature. We further devise a novel but simple method of estimation
1. Beyond these examples, see Attanasio and Pistaferri (2016) for a survey focused on the US
case.
2. For example, while Browning, Crossley, and Winter (2014) provides an excellent recent survey
of methods for measuring household consumption expenditures, the paper focuses exclusively on
aggregate household consumption expenditures.
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which exploits information in both the first and second moments of the distribution of
log expenditures. These features allow us to estimate the first example of a globally-
regular demand system with unrestricted rank which can be used to measure consumer
welfare even if expenditures on only some goods and services are observed.
We next show how CFE demands can be estimated using one or more rounds of
cross-sectional data on disaggregate household expenditures, in a specification using
logarithms of those disaggregate expenditures. This estimator delivers “Frisch elas-
ticities,” estimates of the index λ of each household’s marginal utility of expenditures
(MUE), and estimates of the effects of various observable household characteristics on
demand. Importantly, unobserved household characteristics are naturally introduced
in such a way that they do not bias estimates of the key demand elasticities.
Our estimator is implemented in two (or three) steps. The effects of prices and
household characteristics on expenditures are obtained in a first seemingly-unrelated
regression (SUR) step. A distinctive feature of our approach is that information
regarding the composition of the consumption portfolio is then obtained in a second
step using a singular value decomposition (SVD) of the matrix of residuals, yielding
estimates of Frisch elasticities and λs, up to a time-varying location parameter. When
there are multiple rounds of data an optional third step exploits an auxiliary regression
to estimate these location parameters.
In practice, disaggregate data on expenditures almost invariably contains many
“zeros” or missing data in our application no household reports positive consump-
tion of all goods. This poses a practical challenge how can one compute the SVD
of a matrix with missing values? It also raises the familiar specter of selection bias.
So after describing the steps of our estimation procedure, we first outline an efficient
method for calculating the SVD of a matrix with missing values. We then extend (in
Appendix A) a result from the psychometric literature, which establishes general con-
ditions under which estimation will be unbiased. In our application these conditions
will be satisfied if expenditures are “missing at random” conditional on (shadow)
prices, observed household characteristics, and log λ.3 Finally, the conditions for un-
biasedness immediately suggest a set of exclusion restrictions which can be exploited
3. The usual explanations for observing zeros in such data include being at a corner (the consumer
would like to consume a negative quantity at prevailing prices); stock-outs (the shadow price is higher
than any observed price); or infrequency of purchases (the consumer either has an unobserved stock of
the good, or the good is highly substitutable over short periods); and simple measurement error. Note
that systematic variation in all of these is plausibly explained by prices, household characteristics
and wealth.
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to construct a simple test, which we describe informally in Section 4.2, in detail in
Appendix A.3, and which we implement for our application in Section 6.3.
We observed above that measures of consumption expenditures are critical inputs
to measuring poverty, inequality, and risk. We use our methods to explore these
aspects of welfare using four rounds of data on household expenditures in Uganda,
spanning the period of 2005 2012. These data are instances of the World Bank’s
Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMSs), which have now been conducted in
many countries across many years (Deaton 1997). The Ugandan data are of particular
interest because they span a period which includes the global “food price” crisis of
2008, during which the prices of important cereals more than doubled, as well as a
“great recession” experienced by Uganda in 2010 11. With nothing more than cross-
sectional variation in expenditures in these data, we’re able to obtain estimates of
both the parameters of the demand system and the households’ λs, and to measure
the consequences of these shocks for rates of poverty, inequality, and risk aversion for
differently situated households.
1. Related Literature
The classical approach to welfare measurement associated with Hicks adopts some
cardinal utility function (and the corresponding indirect utility function) as its
lodestar. But it is simply not possible to use observed demand behavior across differ-
ent sorts of households to infer the indirect utility function (Pollak and Wales 1979),
and the present paper can be regarded as one of several recent approaches to devis-
ing measures of welfare which can be inferred from observed behavior. A number
of papers attempt to leverage “Engel’s Second Law” to obtain measures of welfare
from disaggregate expenditures. As the name suggests, the idea of measuring welfare
from disaggregate expenditures is as old as Engel (1857), but there’s been recent
interest in using the details of household expenditures or Engel curves for particular
goods to construct welfare-related measures. Early applications include Costa (2001)
and Hamilton (2001). More recently, Alma˚s (2012) estimates Engel curves for food
from many different countries, and uses these results to correct bias in international
PPP statistics and measures of cross-country inequality. In this paper we address a
similar problem using micro-data to measure inequality and correct CPI statistics in
Uganda, but without adopting Alma˚s’ assumption that there’s a fixed relationship
between food share and real income. Attanasio and Lechene (2014) estimate Engel
curves for food using data from the Mexican Progresa experiment with the aim of
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testing a collective model of the household (Bourguignon, Browning, and Chiappori
2009). They assume that utility from food is additively separable from leisure and
other consumption, a set of assumptions slightly weaker than those of Alma˚s. Atkin
et al. (2018) adopt a much weaker set of assumptions regarding separability and use
estimates of what they call “relative Engel curves” to measure changes in welfare.
But unlike our approach this requires the very strong assumption that there are no
changes in relative prices which affect the slope of these curves. Related, Alma˚s,
Beatty, and Crossley (2018) impose structure associated with the AIDS demand sys-
tem along with a sort of conditional separability. Finally, Young (2012) constructs
a demand system meant to allow welfare comparisons across time for many differ-
ent countries in Africa. But the actual goods used for estimation are mostly fairly
fixed household assets and characteristics, and the demand system itself isn’t theory
consistent.
Note that none of the approaches to welfare described in the previous paragraph
is entirely consistent with the classical Hicksian approach to welfare there is not,
for example, a one-to-one mapping between the expenditure share of food and the
indirect utility function. And although our measure does have a direct relationship
to the indirect utility function (it can be interpreted as the partial derivative of
indirect utility with respect to total expenditures), one cannot generally recover the
indirect utility function from our measure λ. If one observed and estimated demands
for all goods this system of demands could be ‘integrated’ to obtain a rationalizing
indirect utility function, as in Lewbel and Pendakur (2009), but much of the appeal
of our approach (as with the alternative approach of Browning (1999)) is that welfare
inferences can be drawn using only an incomplete demand system.
The relation between λ and consumer demand was first extensively considered by
Ragnar Frisch (see esp. Frisch 1959, 1964, 1978), but wasn’t developed empirically
until demand systems which depend on prices and marginal utility were revived by
Heckman and MaCurdy in the 1970s. This empirical development allowed econome-
tricians to deal with the difficulties of measuring unobserved permanent income in
the context of life-cycle models (Heckman 1974, 1976; Heckman and MaCurdy 1980;
MaCurdy 1981). This was pioneering, but an assumption of complete markets was
central to identification in these early applications, so that risk-averse households
would completely eliminate idiosyncratic risk. These papers also imposed much more
structure on within-period demands than is necessary, requiring that all consump-
tion goods have identical income and price elasticities, and featured demand systems
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which implicitly violated the symmetry characteristic of regular demands.4 Never-
theless, the payoff from these assumptions was significant by assuming a particular
cardinalization (i.e., assuming a particular cardinal utility function within a period)
of homothetic preference structures and constant MUEs, it was possible to estimate
the MUEs as fixed effects in a linear panel regression.
A later generation of life-cycle models relaxed the assumption of full insurance, and
made the idiosyncratic risk borne by households a focus of the analysis. One early
example is Blundell, Browning, and Meghir (1994), which replaces the assumption of
perfect insurance markets with an assumption of perfect credit markets and cleverly
achieves identification of changes in households’ log λ with a cardinalization and an
assumption that these changes are normally distributed. A second important collec-
tion of papers replaces the goal of estimating models featuring homothetic utility and
full insurance with the aim of testing for full insurance (Mace 1991; Deaton 1992;
Cochrane 1991; Townsend 1994). More recent examples connect risk in labor earn-
ings with persistence in consumption to the evolution of inequality (Low, Meghir, and
Pistaferri 2010; Lise 2012; Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten 2016; Arellano,
Blundell, and Bonhomme 2017). The focus of all of these papers remains on highly
aggregate forms of consumption and leisure; none of these exploit within-period con-
sumer choices among disaggregate consumption goods, as in the present paper.
The life-cycle models described thus far use variation over both time and house-
holds to simultaneously estimate within-period demands and the dynamic elements
of the model. However, we are often much more confident that we understand the
within-period allocation decisions made by households than we are in the exact na-
ture of the frictions which shape households’ intertemporal behavior. Blundell (1998)
points out that if preferences are intertemporally separable then the problem can
be tackled in two sequential steps, first using cross-sectional information to partially
identify marginal utilities of expenditure (our λs), and then using variation in λ over
time to estimate or interpret intertemporal behavior. Thus, our approach can be
thought of as an implementation of the first step in this sequential approach, yielding
estimates of the Lagrange multipliers associated with households’ budget constraints
4. Somewhat later demands which depended on prices and λ were given the moniker “Frisch
demands” by Martin Browning (Browning, Deaton, and Irish 1985), but estimation of these imposed
not only the unnecessary restrictions of Heckman and MaCurdy, but also imposed linearity on Engel
curves, and implausible restrictions on intertemporal marginal rates of substitution. Recognition of
this latter problem (Browning 1986) seems to have led to a general abandonment of the approach
for many years.
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using information about contemporary expenditures. This means that estimating an
index of the ‘true’ marginal utility of expenditures exhausts the information available
in contemporaneous expenditures. Thus, though we estimate λs which are house-
holds’ marginal utilities of expenditure for a particular cardinal utility function, one
should think of these estimates as being an Index of the consumer’s ‘true’ Marginal
Utility of Expenditures, or what we’ll call an “IMUE”.
Flexibly estimating the IMUE sequentially has great value in part because the
marginal utility of expenditures is a central object in models of risk and dynamics
in both low- and high-income countries. One important connection is that when
preferences are von Neumann-Morgenstern, the elasticity of the MUE with respect to
total expenditures can be interpreted as (minus) the household’s relative risk aversion.
A large number of recent papers featuring data from low-income countries assume that
a household’s marginal utility of expenditures can be modeled as the household’s
total real household consumption raised to a common negative exponent; examples
include Kinnan (2017) and Karaivanov and Townsend (2014). Papers by Chiappori
et al. (2014) and Laczo´ (2015) relax this by allowing different households to have
different exponents. But this still involves assuming that utilities are homothetic, and
requires the marginal utility of expenditures to depend on a single parameter which
also governs the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Non-parametric approaches
such as that of Mazzocco and Saini (2011) are less restrictive, but at the cost of not
allowing for actual measurement of the IMUE.
2. Summary of empirical contribution
Our development of the CFE demand system along with methods for flexibly es-
timating both demand elasticities and IMUEs provides a useful new toolkit. We use
this toolkit to understand Ugandan consumption expenditures over 2005 2012; this
yields four main novel empirical insights, with implications for policy.
First, we contribute to literature on the estimation of globally regular demand
systems (Cooper and McLaren 1996; Lewbel and Pendakur 2009) by demonstrating
that the rank of consumer demand in Uganda is at least four. This is among the
highest-rank globally regular demand systems ever estimated (Lewbel (2003) esti-
mates a rank 4 system, and the system of Lewbel and Pendakur (2009) is “more
than three”). A long-recognized consequence (Prais 1959) is that one cannot use a
single price index to adjust total consumption expenditures in the Ugandan case, at
least four such indices are necessary to measure changes in welfare due to changes in
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relative prices. While others have tackled this problem (Muellbauer 1974; Pendakur
2002), our approach has much more modest data requirements. Futher, measures of
λ make these adjustments automatically, allowing us to cleanly relate our estimated
IMUEs to traditional expenditure-based measures of headcount poverty.
Second, since the rank of the demand system is greater than one, calculations of
head-count poverty which rely on adjusting total consumption expenditures using a
single price index must be incorrect. The World Bank and Uganda have produced es-
timates of poverty and inequality for Uganda that involve such incorrect calculations.
We use our methods to correct these, and find that while the single-index approach
yields estimates of poverty rates that fell over the course of the 2008 food price crisis
and subsequent recession, our estimates correctly capture the fact that quantities of
most food consumed fell over this period for most households while nominal food
expenditures rose, and thus provide a starkly different picture of changes in both the
level and distribution of welfare in Uganda over this period.
Third, our estimates of IMUE imply not only that many households in Uganda are
poorer than previous estimates indicated, but also allow us to measure households’
relative risk aversions (up to unknown location and scale parameters). The key to
identification of these is simply the requirement that preferences be von Neumann-
Morgenstern. We find strong evidence of heterogeneity in relative risk aversion across
households, and also find that relative risk aversion is decreasing in the expenditures
we observe. This is a much stronger finding than the often asserted claim that ab-
solute risk aversion is decreasing in expenditures, and implies that in fact absolute
risk aversion is decreasing at a more than linear rate. Accordingly, the welfare con-
sequences of risk for poorer households are greatly understated by the homothetic
constant relative risk averse (CRRA) preferences typically assumed in the literature.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 3 with a model
of household behavior, and posit our CIRCSH condition, which attributes differences
in consumption portfolios observed for otherwise similar households to differences in
the households’ budgets. We then show that this condition is satisfied if and only
if demands are described by the globally regular Constant Frisch Elasticity system.
In Section 4 we describe a method of estimating this demand system. Section 5
discusses the Ugandan data used for our application, and then in Section 6 we present
results on estimated demand elasticities and demand system rank. We conduct two
distinct validation exercises, first, showing that our estimated demand system not
only can predict estimated log expenditures well, but also does well at predicting
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both aggregate and individual expenditure shares. Second, we introduce a diagnostic
measure to see whether non-randomly missing data might cause problems for our
estimation, and conclude that it does not. This brings us to our main empirical
finding, which in Section 7 exploits our estimates of IMUEs to understand the welfare
consequences of the 2008 “food price” crisis for welfare in Uganda, with implications
for the measurement of poverty. We contrast results from our approach with those
obtained from the conventional approach, and finally extend our approach to estimate
the relationship between welfare changes induced by the food price crisis and changes
in distribution of risk aversion.
3. Model of Household Behavior
In this section we provide a simple model of household demand behavior,5 and use
this model along with a requirement that welfare differences between similar house-
holds should be identifiable from relative consumptions to obtain a set of globally
regular demands. These demands turn out to depend on an index of household wel-
fare that can be interpreted as the logarithm of the households’ marginal utility of
expenditures (λ). The index λ can be regarded as a function which will generally de-
pend on total expenditures, prices, and household characteristics. By allowing total
expenditures to vary we obtain a Marshallian demand system, but we are interested
in applications in which we may not observe all expenditures. This suggests that we
instead hold the function λ itself constant (Heckman and MaCurdy 1980), yielding a
dual “Frischian” demand system (Browning, Deaton, and Irish 1985). Such demands
are dual to Marshallian demands that do not generally have an explicit represen-
tation, and when separable can be regarded as an instance of the non-homothetic
implicitly-additive Marshallian demands studied by Hanoch (1975) and recently ex-
ploited empirically by Comin, Lashkari, and Mestieri (2015). The key feature of our
demand system is that it allows income elasticities to vary not only across goods,
but also to vary with wealth and with prices in a manner which is both flexible and
guaranteed to be theory consistent. The underlying preference structure is related
to the “direct-addilog” utility first described by Houthakker (1960) or the “CRIE”
5. The discussion and application in this paper have focused on demand at the level of the
household. It will be apparent that if we had data on expenditures at the individual level all the
analysis of the paper would go through. Future research should consider what if we have household-
level data, but inequality and differences in preferences across individuals within the household, as
in recent papers such as Dunbar, Lewbel, and Pendakur (2013) or Calvi (Forthcoming).
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preferences of Caron, Fally, and Markusen (2014), but allows for flexible substitution
patterns across goods.
3.1. The household’s one-period consumer problem. Suppose that in a par-
ticular period t a household with some vector of characteristics zt faces a vector of
prices pt for n¯ goods, and has budgeted a quantity of the numeraire good xt to spend
on contemporaneous consumption ct ∈ X ⊆ Rn¯++.6 The household’s preferences are
assumed to be intertemporally separable, with orderings over consumption bundles
within a period summarized by a utility function U ∈ U , where U is the set of utility
functions mapping X into R which are increasing, concave, and continuously twice
differentiable. The set U is said to be the set of regular utility functions.
At time t the household solves the standard consumer’s problem of maximizing
utility subject to a budget constraint, or
(1) V (xt, pt; zt) = max
c∈X
U(c; zt) such that p>t c ≤ xt.
An interior solution to this problem is characterized by a set of n¯ first order conditions
for consumption goods which take the form
(2) ui(c; zt) = λ∗tpit,
where ui denotes the partial derivative of the momentary utility function U with re-
spect to the ith good, and where pit is the price of the ith good in period t. In addition
there’s the budget constraint, with which the Lagrange multiplier λ∗t is associated.
A solution to (1) takes the form of a vector of demands c(xt, pt; zt) and a function
λ∗t = λ∗(xt, pt; zt). If these demands satisfy (2) for some positive (x, p) we say that the
demand system is regular at (x, p); if demands satisfy (2) for all positive (x, p) then
these demands are said to be globally regular. A classical identification result tells us
that knowledge of globally regular demands allows us to identify the utility function
of a household with characteristics zt up to a monotonic transformation M : R →
R, determining an equivalence class of utility functions C(U) = {M(U)|c(x, p; z) ∈
arg maxc∈XM(U(c; z)) such that p>c ≤ x}. If M(U) ∈ U for all U ∈ U (i.e., it maps
regular utility functions into regular utility functions) then we say that M is a regular
transformation, and denote by M the class of regular transformations.
6. Note that if the vector zt includes decisions the household has made about time use and
the vector of prices pt includes prevailing wage rates then this formulation of the problem can
accommodate decision problems involving non-separable leisure.
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By construction, regular transformations of the utility function don’t affect de-
mands, but of course they can change the marginal utility of expenditures. The fol-
lowing proposition enumerates some facts about the relationship between the MUE
of a consumer with utility U and that of a consumer with utility M(U) when M is
regular.
Proposition 1. Let M : R→ R be a regular transformation. Then
(1) A household with utility U ∈ U which chooses c to solve (1) has a marginal
utility of expenditures given by a function λ∗(x, p; z) = ∂V/∂x. This function
is continuously differentiable in (x, p), strictly decreasing in x, and strictly
increasing in p.
(2) A household which has a utility function M(U) and chooses c to solve (1)
has a marginal utility of expenditures given by a function λM(x, p; z) =
λ∗(x, p; z)M ′(V (x, p; z)); and
(3) The function λM(x, p; z) varies one-to-one with λ∗(x, p; z), and shares its prop-
erties of being continuously differentiable, decreasing in x, and increasing in
p.
Proof. A solution to (1) gives a vector of demands c(x, p; z). Since U ∈ U is differ-
entiable, λ∗(x, p; z) = ∂V/∂x exists and is a continuously differentiable function of
(x, p). The concavity of U along with standard comparative statics arguments imply
that λ∗ is decreasing in x and increasing in p, establishing (1). For (2), the household’s
indirect utility function is M(V (x, p; z)); since M is regular we can obtain the mar-
ginal utility of x by the chain rule. For (3), observe that both λ∗ and M ′(V (x, p; z))
are positive but monotonically decreasing in x and monotonically increasing in p;
accordingly the product of the two is similarly monotone, establishing a one-to-one
relationship between λ∗ and λM . 
If we observe demands c(x, p; z) we can identify the set of utility functions that
would generate those demands. One consequence of Proposition 1 is that we can
also identify the set of marginal utilities of expenditures L(V ) = {λM ′(V )|λ =
∂V/∂x;M ∈M} consistent with those demands.
Since we can use data on demands c to obtain measures of some utility and MUE
(U, λ) which are consistent with these demands, there’s a strong sense in which it
doesn’t matter which (U, λ) we obtain, since with any such pair we can (i) characterize
the entire set; and (ii) any U and corresponding λ consistent with observed demands
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will have a one-to-one relationship with every other demand-consistent utility function
and MUE.
Because many different pairs of (U, λ) are consistent with any particular demand
system we’re free to make assumptions that pin down particular utility functions
provided these don’t restrict observed behavior. Such assumptions can be thought
of as normalizations or perhaps ‘cardinalizations,’ as this amounts to choosing a
particular cardinal (momentary) utility functions. Of course, for welfare comparisons
across households it’s important to adopt the same cardinalization.
3.2. Welfare and the demand system. Let ℵ(x, p, z) be any household-level wel-
fare measure which aggregates information on budgets, prices, and characteristics
into a real-valued scalar. Interesting examples of such welfare measures include the
indirect utility function (which plays a central role in Hicksian welfare analysis), to-
tal expenditures (perhaps deflated by a price index, which play a prominent role in
measurements of poverty), the expenditure share of food (as suggested by Engel), or
the MUE we’ve discussed above.
The idea of this paper is to explore what can be learned about such a welfare
measure from the composition of the consumption portfolio, rather than its scale.
Let us conduct a simple thought experiment, and suppose that there two different
households with total budgets x and x′, respectively, which consume bundles c and
c′. The two households are otherwise identical, and face the same prices; we call
such households similar. We don’t observe x and x′, but do observe quantities (or
expenditures) for several different goods consumed by the two households (ci, c′i),
i ∈ I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n¯}. Then any scale-free measurement of the welfare of the two
similar households should be based on relative demands c′i/ci for different goods i.
What restrictions on demands will allow us to draw inferences regarding welfare
from a collection of relative consumptions for similar households? Since prices and
characteristics are the same for both households, we want conditions which would
allow us to attribute observed relative consumptions solely to differences between
the two households’ welfare. Further, since we may not observe all relevant prices
or household characteristics, we want the mapping from relative consumptions for
similar households into welfare to not depend on prices or characteristics. This need
not be true of all goods, but for at least some different goods relative demands should
satisfy a condition we call “Conditional Independence of Relative Consumptions for
Similar Households” (CIRCSH):
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Condition 1 (CIRCSH). Good i exhibits Conditional Independence of Relative Con-
sumptions for Similar Households if, for any positive x, x′, p, and any z, demand ci
satisfies
ci(x′, p; z)
ci(x, p; z)
= gi(ℵ(x′, p, z),ℵ(x, p, z))
for some non-constant scalar functions ℵ and gi.
Let CIRCSH denote both the condition and also the set of goods having demands
satisfying the condition. Thus, for any good i ∈ CIRCSH, the relative consumptions
of similar households can depend on prices, characteristics, and budgets, but only
via an aggregator ℵ which takes values which can vary across households, not across
goods. The relationship between the aggregators for two similar households are re-
lated to relative consumption of good i by a good-specific function gi. Knowledge
of the function gi along with observations on relative consumptions provides infor-
mation about the relative welfare of the two households as measured by the welfare
aggregators ℵ(x′, p, z) and ℵ(x, p, z) for a given (p, z).
How restrictive is the CIRCSH condition? Any globally regular demands that are
“Generalized Linear” (Muellbauer 1975) will satisfy CIRCSH (and many demands are
CIRCSH that are not generalized linear). Special cases of such demands described
by Muellbauer can be obtained by placing additional restrictions on the aggregator
ℵ. For example, globally regular “Price Independent Generalized Linear” (PIGL),
“Price Independent Generalized Logarithmic” (PIGLog), or any homothetic demand
system will satisfy CIRCSH with an aggregator ℵ(x, p, z) = ℵ(x, z) (if one sets aside
the requirement of global regularity then the claim goes through for some translation
of demands, where the translation depends only on prices).
Aside from this, CIRCSH on its own is not enough to estimate demands or measure
welfare; additional restrictions on the aggregator ℵ and good-specific functions gi are
required. However, the requirement of global regularity along with CIRCSH provides
sufficient restrictions. The following proposition indicates the class of demands which
are both CIRCSH and also globally regular. Further, it implies that there is no loss of
generality in taking the welfare measure ℵ(x, p, z) to be equal to the IMUE λ(x, p, z).
Proposition 2. Any globally regular demand system has demand for good i satisfying
Condition CIRCSH if and only if demand for good i can be written in the form
(3) log ci(x, p, z) = log γi(p) + δi(z)− βi log λ(x, p, z),
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for some function of prices γi(p), some function of characteristics δi(z), and some
positive scalar βi, where the positive function λ is common across all goods.
Proof. It’s immediate that any demand with form (3) satisfies Condition CIRCSH,
with ℵ(x, p, z) = λ(x, p, z) and gi(ℵ(x′, p, z),ℵ(x, p, z)) = (ℵ(x, p, z)/ℵ(x′, p, z))βi . To
establish that these demands are part of a globally regular system, we have only to
construct a utility function U ∈ U with the property that maximizing this utility
function subject to a budget constraint yields demands of the form (3). Let U(c; z) =∑
i e
δi(z) βi
βi−1(c
1−1/βi
i − 1). It’s simple to verify that this function is in U provided only
that βi is positive and not equal to one for all i. The corresponding marginal utilities
are given by ui(c, z) = eδi(z)c−1/βii . Substituting this into the first order condition for
good i
ui(c; z) = piλ(x, p, z)
and rearranging yields a demand function of the required form.
We establish the converse in four steps. First, note that since demand for good i
is globally regular then demand for this good must satisfy the first order conditions
ui(c; z) = piλ, with λ the multiplier on the budget constraint in the consumer’s
problem, or in a vector notation u(c; z) = pλ, with c and p both n¯-vectors. Since
elements of U are concave, it follows that u(·; z) is invertible, yielding c = u−1(pλ; z) ≡
f(pλ, z). For any good i, define
Φi(x′, x, p, z) =
(
fi(pλ(x′, p, z), z)
fi(pλ(x, p, z), z)
)
/gi(ℵ(x′, p, z),ℵ(x, p, z)),
and observe that CIRCSH holds if and only if Φ(x′, x, p, z) = 1 for all (x′, x, p, z); this
implies that Φ(x′′, x, p, z) = Φ(x′, x, p, z). Then
fi(pλ(x′′, p, z), z)
fi(pλ(x′, p, z), z)
= gi(ℵ(x
′′, p, z),ℵ(x, p, z))
gi(ℵ(x′, p, z),ℵ(x, p, z)) .
Since x doesn’t appear on the left-hand side of this equation, it follows that gi(ℵ′,ℵ) =
hi(ℵ′)/hi(ℵ) for some positive function hi.
Second, rewrite the budget constraint in the consumer’s problem (1) as (p/x)>c ≤
1; then the value of the multiplier associated with this transformed constraint is
xλ(1, p/x, z). Fixing z allows us to write this as xλ(p/x) in the obvious abuse of
notation. Substituting this for λ and p/x for p into the previous equation, then
taking x = 1, we have
fi(pλ(p/x′))
fi(pλ(p))
= hi(ℵ(p/x
′))
hi(ℵ(p)) .
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Then with a further change of variable we can write
(4) fi(pλ(p/x)) = γi(p)hi(ℵ(p/x))
for γi(p) = fi(pλ(p))/hi(ℵ(p)).
Because λ is strictly increasing in every price pi, there exists a function θ(p) which
maps a vector of prices to a positive scalar, so that λ¯(θ(p/x)) ≡ λ(p/x) for all positive
(p, x). Letting all prices be equal to one in (4), let ℵ(θ) solve
fi(λ¯(θ)) = γi(1)hi(ℵ¯(θ)),
where ℵ¯(θ) is defined analogously to λ¯(θ), (i.e., with x = 1 and all prices equal to
θ), and where 1 denotes an n¯-vector of ones. Since λ¯(θ) is strictly monotone in θ, a
change of variables gives
fi(λ¯) = γi(1)hi(ℵ¯(λ¯)),
establishing a one-to-one relationship between λ¯ and ℵ¯. But since λ¯(θ(p/x)) ≡ λ(p/x),
substitution yields
fi(λ(p/x)) = γi(1)hi(ℵ¯(λ(p/x)));
rearranging and inverting implies
ℵ(p/x) ≡ ℵ¯(λ(p/x)) = h−1i
[
fi(λ(p/x))
gi(1)
]
,
giving a one-to-one relationship between ℵ(p/x) and λ(p/x).
Exploiting this one-to-one relationship, let bi(λ) ≡ hi(ℵ). Substituting into (4),
fi(pλ) = γi(p)bi(λ),
establishing the separability of fi.
Third, use these results to re-write the original CIRCSH condition as
fi(pλ(x′, p, z), z)
fi(pλ(x, p, z), z)
= bi(λ(x
′, p, z))
bi(λ(x, p, z))
.
Fixing (x¯, p¯), define di(z) = fi(p¯λ(x¯, p¯, z), so that we have fi(pλ, z) = γi(p)bi(λ)di(z),
with (γi, bi, di) all positive functions.
Finally, to establish the form of the function bi, take logs, obtaining
log fi(elog λ+log p, z) = log γi(p) + log di(z) + log bi(λ).
Fixing z = z0, this is an example of Pexider’s functional equation g(x+ y) = h(x) +
`(y), and so bi(λ) = λ−βi (Acze´l and Dhombres 1989, Corollary 10, Chapter 4) for
some constant βi > 0, implying that the demand equation must take the form (3). 
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We call the form of demands in (3) Constant Frisch Elasticity (CFE) demands, as
the coefficient βi can be interpreted as the elasticity of demand with respect to λ, a
way of thinking about demands proposed by Frisch (1959). The result establishes that
globally regular demands satisfying the CIRCSH condition must be in the CFE class.
Thus, having adopted the CIRCSH condition (which seems to be necessary for us to
draw inferences regarding welfare from relative consumptions when our information
on prices and characteristics is incomplete) and once we’ve required observed demands
to be globally regular (which is important if we’re to measure welfare in settings with
risk) our hands are essentially tied: demands must take the CFE form (3).
4. Estimation with Incomplete Data
This paper is motivated in part by an awareness of ignorance: If the econometrician
does not observe all relevant prices, characteristics, and quantities, then what can
be learned about household welfare? Proposition 2 provides necessary and sufficient
conditions for developing a welfare measure that is conditionally independent of prices
and characteristics, and further dictates that the welfare measure enter (log) demands
in a (log) linear fashion, with the remaining influence of prices p and characteristics
z on demand for good i summarized by functions γi(p) and δi(z), respectively. In
this section we provide methods for using one or more cross-sectional samples of data
on households’ expenditures and characteristics to estimate key parameters of the
demand system, along with household-specific estimates of welfare. In addition to
the requirements of Proposition 2, we adopt three sets of identifying assumptions.
Some of these are harmless normalizations or ‘accounting conventions’, while others
amount to the standard requirement that the disturbance term be mean independent
of the explanatory variables in the demand equation. There’s a strong similarity to the
demand problem considered by data (2006); as in that case our estimating equation
is “conditionally linear”, and latent variables (price effects and log λ in our case,
household fixed effects in theirs) play a key role in delivering the mean independence
we require.
Suppose we have data from T ≥ 1 rounds of cross-sectional observations, with Jt
households randomly sampled in each round t, and a total number of observations
J = ∑Tt=1 Jt. A given observation is then identified by a pair (j, t) naming the
household and the time at which it was observed; the observation consists of a vector
of expenditures and a set of household characteristics.
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Let I ⊆ CIRCSH denote the index set of observed expenditures with demands
satisfying Condition 1, and let the cardinality of I be n ≤ n¯. In addition to not
observing expenditures on all goods, we must allow for the fact that we don’t observe
all prices and characteristics. We begin by assuming that the econometrician observes
a vector of characteristics z˜, a subset of all characteristics z. Further, we adopt the
following assumptions regarding the relationship between z and z˜.
Assumption 1. Let the effect of characteristics z on demand for good i ∈ I condi-
tional on λ and prices p be governed by the function δ(z), which maps characteristics
into an n-vector. This function is related to observable characteristics z˜ by
(5) δi(z) = αi + d>i z˜ + ζi(z) i ∈ I,
with di a vector of parameters. Regarding z as a vector of random variables, we
assume
(1) E(ζi(z)|λ, p, z˜) = 0 and Eδi(z) = αi for i ∈ I;
(2) Var(δ(z)|λ, p, z˜) = Var(ζ(z)) = Ξ, with Ξ finite and positive semi-definite.
The equation (5) on its own is without loss of generality, but Assumption 1.1
asserts that the unobserved residual ζi(z) is mean independent of (λ, p, z˜), so that the
conditional expectation is linear in z˜. This is less restrictive than it may appear, but
some assumption along these lines is necessary for identification. An example of the
issue is this: suppose that z = z˜ is simply household size, and that larger households
tend to have larger expenditures on all goods. Assumption 1.1 accounts for this by
attributing the higher levels of consumption to the observed household size, not to a
possible correlation between household size and (unobserved) budget. More generally,
if a particular set of characteristics z has the effect of changing demand for all goods in
the same way that a change in total budget would, then this will be accounted for by
the observable characteristics, by the latent index λ(x, p, z), and by prices, not by the
residual function ζi(z). Assumption 1.2 allows for arbitrary patterns of covariance in
δi(z) across demand equations, but requires that the conditional variance not depend
on any of (λ, p, z˜). This is restrictive, but standard.
We next spell out some parallel assumptions on log λ(x, p, z).
Assumption 2. For any positive p and z˜, conditional expectations and variances of
log λ(x, p, z) exist and satisfy:
(1) E(log λ(x, p, z)|p, z˜) = E(log λ(x, p, z)|p) = µ(p);
(2) Var(log λ(x, p, z)|p) = σ2(p); and
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(3) σ2(1) = 1, where 1 is a vector of prices all equal to one.
Assumption 2.1 defines a conditional expectation function µ(p) of log λ, and asserts
that this conditional expectation doesn’t depend on the observed z˜. As with part (1)
of the previous assumption this can be thought of requiring that variation in budgets
be captured by λ, while variation in demand due to observable characteristics should
be captured by δ. Assumption 2.2 simply defines the conditional variance function
σ2(p), while Assumption 2.3 is a harmless normalization, which sets this variance to
be unity if all prices are identically equal to one.
We next address the possibility that not only do we observe just a subset of ex-
penditures, but that the expenditures we do observe may be measured with error.
Let xi = pici denote ‘true’ expenditures on good i. Expenditures may be observed
with random measurement error; we make the following assumption regarding these
measurement errors.
Assumption 3. Observed log expenditures on good i ∈ I are given by
(6) yi = log xi + i,
where i is the ith element of an n-vector of random measurement errors . We assume
that E(|p, z˜, log λ) = 0, and that E> = Σ is finite and positive semi-definite.
Allowing for the possibility of measurement error is not restrictive, of course, and we
permit arbitrary patterns of correlation in measurement error across different goods.
The assumption that errors are mean independent of prices, observable characteristics,
and log λ is standard; note that we do not rule out the possibility of heteroskedasticity
(i.e., the covariance of  across goods may vary with prices, observed characteristics,
or log λ).
Now consider the ‘reduced form’ system of regression equations for observations of
households at different periods
(7) yi = Sai +Zdi + ei, i = 1, . . . , n,
where bold-faced variables are vectors or matrices with J rows (i.e., variables that
change their form with sample size). Thus, yi is a vector of J observed log expendi-
tures on good i, for all observed households in all rounds, and S = (s1, . . . , sT ) is a
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J × T matrix
S =

1J1 0 · · · 0
0 1J2 0
...
... 0 . . . 0
0 · · · 0 1JT
 ,
where 1k is a column vector of k ones, and the zeros in the matrix conform. The
vector ai = (ai1, ai2, . . . , aiT )> is a set of good-specific time effects. Interpretation
of estimated parameters is simpler if Z and S are orthogonal, so we define Z =
(I −S(S>S)−1S>)z˜ to be the J × ` matrix of observed characteristics in deviations
from their period-by-period means. Then di is the `-vector of parameters which
appears in (5); finally ei is a J-vector of residuals. More compactly, the equation can
be written as
yi = Xbi + ei,
with X = [S,Z] a J × (T + `) matrix and bi = [ai; di] a (T + `) vector of parameters.
This forms a system of n seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). If we concatenate
these equations horizontally and stack observations vertically we can write the system
for our sample in the matrix form
Y
J×n
= S
J×T
A
T×n
+ Z
J×`
D
`×n
+ E
J×n
,
or more compactly
(8) Y = XB + E ,
where X = [S,Z] and B = [A>, D>]>. The usual rank conditions are presumed to
satisfied, with X>X having full rank.
4.1. Estimation Steps. Putting together our description of the demand system
with our assumptions regarding unobserved characteristics and measurement error,
it follows that observed log expenditures on good i ∈ I at time t for a household j
with observed characteristics zjt will take the form of the estimating equation:
(9) yjit = ait + d>i z˜
j
t + βi(µt − log λjt) + jit + ζjit.
Estimation of (9) proceeds in two (or three) steps. The first step estimates co-
efficients di and the good-time effects (related to prices) ait. The second estimates
elasticities β and µt− log λjt . If we have more than a single cross-section a third step
can exploit this, estimating the location parameters µt.
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Step 1: OLS. The first step yields estimates of the effects of prices and observable
characteristics on demand. We estimate the n(T + `) parameters of (8) via ordinary
least squares (OLS); then Bˆ = (X>X)−1X>Y are the estimated coefficients, and
Eˆ = (I −X(X>X)−1X>)Y denotes the J × n matrix of OLS residuals. Note that
though there is no restriction on the covariance matrix of the disturbances across
equations, random sampling implies independence across observations. Combining
these assumptions with the observation that each equation in the SUR system has
the same right-hand side variables, it follows that Bˆ is the best unbiased estimator
of B (Zellner 1962).
Step 2: Singular Value Decomposition. In the second step, we estimate the n-vector
of Frisch elasticities β and the household IMUEs up to a location parameter. This is
accomplished by computing the singular value decomposition (SVD) of the residual
matrix Eˆ ; this provides what we need to estimate elasticities β and wjt = µ(pt)−log λjt .
The SVD of Eˆ can be written
Eˆ =
n∑
k=1
σkukv
>
k ,
where the σk are the singular values of Eˆ (ordered so that σk ≥ σk+1); the uk are the
corresponding left singular vectors, having length n; and the vk are the corresponding
right singular vectors, with length J . Some important and well-known properties of
the SVD are that u>k uk = v>k vk = 1 for k = 1, . . . , n, and that u>k uk′ = v>k vk′ = 0
for all k 6= k′; that is, the uk and vk are orthonormal vectors.
Calculation of the SVD is a standard basic matrix operation. With the SVD in
hand, we simply let βˆ = σ1v1φ, the largest singular value of Eˆ multiplied by its
corresponding right singular vector and a non-zero constant φ; and let wˆ = u1/φ
denote the corresponding left singular vector divided by the same constant. Then we
have
Eˆ = wˆβˆ> +
n∑
k=2
σkukv
>
k = wˆβˆ> + ε.
Note that the property of orthonormality then implies that w>ε = 0. By the Eckart-
Young theorem the outer product wˆβˆ> is the rank-one matrix closest to Eˆ in a
least-squares sense (i.e., under the Frobenius norm). We exploit both this and the
orthonormality property of the left and right singular vectors in the following propo-
sition to develop a useful property of the estimator (βˆ, wˆ).
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Proposition 3. If demands take the CFE form (3), at every time t = 1, . . . , T all
households face the same prices pt, and Assumptions 1 3 are satisfied, then Eβˆiwˆjt =
βiw
j
t for all i ∈ I, and all households j = 1, . . . , Jt.
Proof. Consider the conditional expectation of yi given (z˜, p, λ); this is
E(yi|z˜, p, λ) = E(log pi + log ci + i|z˜, p, λ)
= E(log pi + log ci|z˜, p, λ) by Assumption 3;
= E(log pi + γi(p) + δi(z)− βi log λ|z˜, p, λ) from (3)
= log pi + γi(p) + αi + d>i z˜ − βi log λ by Assumptions 1 & 2.
Define ai(p) = αi + log pi + γi(p)− βiµ(p). Then we have
E(yi|z˜, p, λ) = ai(p) + d>i z˜ + βi(µ(p)− log λ).
Now, consider the expected value of yi conditional on the information set (z˜, p); by
the law of iterated expectations and Assumption 2 we obtain
E(yi|z˜, p) = ai(p) + d>i z˜.
By assumption at time t everyone faces the same prices pt, so we can write ait = ai(pt),
with ai = (ai1, . . . , aiT ) corresponding to the same vector as in (7), and
E(yi|z˜, ai) = ai + d>i z˜.
The vector of errors in (7) is
ei = yi − E(yi|Z,a) = yi − ai − d>i Z = wβi + i + ζi,
where w is a J-vector consisting of elements wjt = µ(pt) − log λjt , and where i and
ζi are J-vectors of measurement errors jit and ζi(z
j
t ).
OLS provides an unbiased estimate of the matrix of coefficients B, so that E(Eˆ|E) =
E . Conditioning on w gives
E(Eˆ|w) = E(E|w) = wβ>.
The SVD of the matrix of OLS residuals yields
Eˆ = wˆβˆ> + εˆ,
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with wˆ>εˆ = 0 by construction, so
(10) E[wˆβˆ> + εˆ|w] = E[wˆβˆ>|w] = wβ>.

Thus, using OLS to estimate (7) and then calculating the SVD of the OLS residuals
gives an unbiased estimate of the outer product of elasticities β and welfare measures
w up to the scalar constant φ. Our choice of φ amounts to a choice of units, and
is consequently somewhat arbitrary. One natural choice would be to take φ = 1;
this would then imply the estimated variance of w (pooled across all observations)
σˆ2 = J−1wˆ>wˆ = 1. However, our Assumption 2.2 implies a different normalization,
which sets the estimated variance of w in period one to unity. This normalization
implies that φ =
√
J−11
∑J1
j=1 u
j
11
2 is the maximum likelihood estimate of the standard
deviation of the elements of the left-singular vector u1 observed in the first period.
We adopt this normalization henceforth.
Some remarks are in order. First, while the outer product wˆβˆ> is an unbiased
estimator of wβ>, βˆ and wˆ are not unbiased estimators of β and w. However,
βˆ is
√
J-consistent, with the immediate consequence that wˆ is asymptotically un-
biased. Second, in the homoskedastic Gaussian case in which  ∼ N (0, σ2 I) and
ζ(z) ∼ N (0, σ2ζI) these are the maximum likelihood estimators (MLE), and so are
efficient (Anderson 1963; Tipping and Bishop 1999). We choose to not adopt these
distributional assumptions, but the estimators βˆ and wˆ can nevertheless be regarded
as quasi-MLE estimators.
Step 3: Auxiliary Regression. In step one of the estimation procedures we obtained
estimates of ait and di; in step two we obtained estimates of elasticities β and wjt =
µ(pt) − log λjt . But to identify log λjt we need an estimate of the location parameter
µ(pt). If T = 1 this is no problem, because µ(pt) is just a constant we can choose via
some normalization (e.g., set it to zero).
However, if we have T > 1 and we wish to be able to make welfare comparisons
across periods then we must estimate the different µ(pt) for t = 1, . . . , T . Our ap-
proach to this begins by recalling from the proof of Proposition 3 that µ(pt) appears
not only in w, but also in each of the terms ait for i = 1, . . . , n, with
(11) ait = αi − βiµ(pt) + log pit + γi(pt).
We re-write the terms involving prices as −βiµ(pt) + log pit + γi(pt) = −βiµ(pt) +
log p¯t+ ri(pt), where p¯t serves as a measure of the price level, and where the ri(pt) are
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then a measure of the log relative price of good i within period t. This then gives us
(12) ait = αi − βiµt + log p¯t + rit,
where we exploit the assumption of common prices to define µt = µ(pt) and rit =
ri(pt). Since we can choose the units in which different prices are measured we’re free
to adopt the following normalizations: (i) p¯1 = pi1 = 1 for all i; (ii) ri(1n) = 0 for all
i; (iii) µ1 = 0; and finally we require (iv) that ri(pt) be uncorrelated with αi, βi, and
log p¯t. Beyond these defining restrictions we assume that prices may be unobserved
by the econometrician. But even without prices these normalizations and restrictions
identify or define all the unknown quantities on the right-hand side of (12). The term
αi is a good-specific preference parameter; µt is the mean value of log λjt at time t,
and can be thought of as a measure of aggregate welfare at time t; p¯t is the general
price level at time t; and rit is the log of the relative price of good i at time t.
We then construct an auxiliary regression. From step one we have nT estimates
aˆit of the left-hand-side variable ait as well as estimates Vˆ of the nT × nT covariance
matrix of the aˆit. From step two we have estimates βˆi of the elasticities that appear
on the right-hand side of (12). Then regarding this as a two-way error component
balanced panel model, we treat (12) as a regression of our previously estimated good-
time effects on n good fixed effects, T time effects, and on the generated regressors
βˆi interacted with a collection of time effects, or
(13) aˆit = αi + ηt + µtβˆi + rit, with
∑
t
ηt = 0.
This regression could be estimated via OLS, which would be unbiased. But if Var(aˆ) 6=
σ2aI then the residuals rit will be heteroskedastic, and OLS inefficient. A simple
feasible GLS estimator is available, since we already have estimates of the covariance
matrix of the aˆ.
So, our step three involves two within transformationsWi andWt which respectively
eliminate the good and time effects in (13) (incidentally yielding estimates of the
preference parameters α and the log of the price level), and estimates
µˆ = (X˜>Vˆ −1X˜)−1X˜>Vˆ −1a˜,
where X˜ = WiWtIT ⊗ βˆ and a˜ = WiWta. This feasible GLS estimator has the usual
properties of being consistent and asymptotically efficient.
4.2. Missing Data. Our demand system permits estimation of arbitrarily large and
extremely disaggregate demand systems. In practice this raises the possibility that
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many different item expenditures may be “zeros” or missing for a given household.
Thus, our SVD must somehow contend with missing data; the algorithm we’ve de-
veloped for doing this is described in Appendix A. But in addition to the issue of
calculation, missing data raises the possibility of issues related to selection, biasing
our estimates of the demand system (Vella 1998, gives a survey). To address this, we
adapt methods developed in the psychometric literature to show that our estimator
of elasticities and log λs is unbiased under general conditions even with such missing
data, and provide a simple test of these conditions.
In our application, no household in our sample reports positive expenditures for
every good, and overall fewer than 40% of all possible item expenditures are reported
to be positive. Where recorded values of consumption expenditure are equal to zero,
we regard these as missing and drop them from the analysis. There are two reasons
for this treatment of zeros: first, at an entirely practical level, our dependent vari-
able is the logarithm of expenditures, which is undefined at zero. But second, if a
household is at a corner when it chooses a particular consumption item, then the first
order condition in (2) for that consumption good won’t hold (we’d be missing a mul-
tiplier related to non-negativity). By simply dropping observations for goods where
consumption is zero we are effectively dropping observations where expenditures do
not correctly reveal the index log λ.
Our resolution is described in detail in Appendix A, and is similar to the way that
fixed effects estimation can address the problem of selection in unbalanced panels of
households over time (e.g., Wooldridge 2002, Section 17.7.1). Roughly, just as fixed
effects addresses selection if selection conditional on the fixed effects is random, in
our case if data is missing at random conditional on (a, z˜, log λ) then selection won’t
be an issue.
A simple practical test for selection bias can be constructed by using an approach
related to one advocated by Wooldridge, in which we first regress an indicator for
whether expenditures xjit are positive on the same right-hand side variables as appear
in (7), and compute residuals from this regression. We then use these residuals to
augment the matrix of residuals from the first step estimation of (7), and use a singular
value decomposition of the resulting n × 2J matrix to obtain alternative estimates
βˆr and wˆr of elasticities and the household specific welfare meaures w. If selection
is an issue then these estimated values will differ from the values obtained from the
decomposition of the unaugmented residual matrix.
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5. Data
We use the methods described above to measure households’ welfare in Uganda over
an interval of time which encompasses the 2008 “food price crisis” and a recession
in 2010 11. We have data from four rounds of the World Bank’s Living Standards
Measurement Surveys (LSMSs) conducted in Uganda (in 2005 06, 2009 10, 2010 11,
and 2011 12).7 For the sake of concision we will sometimes refer to the 2005 06
round as “2005”, and so on. We first give a descriptive account of some of the data
on household characteristics and expenditures from these surveys.
Table 1. Mean characteristics of households in Uganda by year.
Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.
t Jt Boys Girls Men Women Rural
2005 3115 1.48 1.48 1.12 1.24 0.72
(1.45) (1.44) (0.89) (0.86) (0.45)
2009 2927 1.70 1.67 1.21 1.33 0.74
(1.55) (1.50) (0.97) (0.89) (0.44)
2010 2639 1.77 1.78 1.26 1.40 0.78
(1.57) (1.56) (1.01) (0.95) (0.41)
2011 2795 1.70 1.72 1.23 1.37 0.80
(1.53) (1.53) (0.97) (0.86) (0.40)
Table 1 provides information on the household characteristics we employ in our
application. In each of four rounds, there are about 3000 households; of these, between
70 80% are rural. The average household size consists of 5.8 people; the average rural
household is larger, at 5.9, while the average urban household consists of 5.5 people.8
Household members eighteen years or younger are taken to be boys or girls. Excluding
durables, taxes, and “fees & transfers”, there are 110 categories of expenditure in the
data, of which 72 are different food items or categories, and 38 are other nondurables
or services.9
7. These datasets are public use datasets available from the World Bank.
8. For our purposes a person is a household member if they’ve lived in the household for at least
one month of the previous twelve. People identified as ‘guests’ who satisfy these criteria must also
have spent the night prior to the interview.
9. There are some minor discrepancies in food items across periods; see Appendix B for details
and the way in which we’ve addressed these discrepancies.
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The Ugandan surveys we use elicit information on food consumption over the last
seven days, with consumption quantities and values reported as being “out of pur-
chases,” “out of home produce,” or “received in-kind/free;” consumption out of pur-
chases “away from home” is also elicited for selected food items. Where consumption
is “out of home produce” or “received in-kind/free” values as well as quantities are
elicited. This recall period and approach to eliciting the source of consumption is
typical of household consumption and expenditure surveys (Fiedler et al. 2012), and
is designed to distinguish between the acquisition of stocks of food and consumption.
To avoid issues with different expenditures being elicited with different recall periods
(Tarozzi 2007) in our estimation we restrict attention to goods with seven day recall
period, which effectively restricts attention to different kinds of food.
Appendix B.1 reports aggregate expenditure shares across these categories, listing
mean and aggregate expenditure shares for all foods, ordered by the size of their
aggregate expenditure share in 2005. Aggregate shares are fairly stable across the
period 2005 2011, with only a handful of goods changing their aggregate shares by
as much as one percentage point (the only exceptions are cassava, sugar, and “other
foods.”). It should be noted, however, that stability of shares over time is not a
prediction of theory, save in a homothetic demand system changes in incomes or
relative prices can be expected to cause changes in shares.
However, while mean and aggregate shares are often fairly stable over time, for
some goods mean and aggregate shares differ dramatically from each other. On its
face this is not consistent with a model in which consumers have homothetic utility.
Such a model would predict equal aggregate and mean expenditure shares.
This general point is graphically borne out in Figure 1. For this figure we construct
a statistic ρit which is the logarithm of aggregate shares minus the logarithm of mean
shares, or, for good i at time t,
ρit = log
 ∑Jtj=1 xjit∑Jt
j=1
∑n
k=1 x
j
kt
− log
J−1t Jt∑
j=1
xjit∑n
k=1 x
j
kt
 .
We then produce a scatterplot of this statistic, ordered by the size of the statistic in
2005. Thus, each good i (labelled on the left axis) has an associated statistic ρit for
each period t, each with (overlapping) confidence intervals.
With homothetic preferences, this statistic must always be equal to zero, but we can
reject this equality for most of the goods in the figure. Instead, a positive value of the
statistic identifies goods which play an outsized role in the consumption portfolios
of wealthier (i.e., higher expenditure) households. Such goods include beer, soda,
25
Figure 1. Log of aggregate shares minus log of mean shares for
different years (ordered by ranking in 2005), with 95% confidence in-
tervals.
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passion fruits, chicken, bread, spending at restaurants, eggs, and beef, among others.
Conversely, when the statistic is negative we identify goods that are particularly
important in the portfolios of households with lower food expenditure. Here we see
sorghum, “other vegetables”, salt, sim sim (sesame) and dry beans.
Figure 1 and this prima facie case against homotheticity implies that the composi-
tion of households’ consumption portfolios will vary systematically with total budget.
This kind of variation is exactly what we wish to use to draw inferences about welfare
even absent information on all expenditures.
6. Results
6.1. Estimates of Demand Elasticities. We now turn to estimates of some of the
parameters of the the demand system (9), estimated using the four rounds of data
from Uganda discussed above. Table 2 presents results from our baseline specifica-
tion. In this specification we obtain results for a system of 44 minimally aggregated
consumption goods, assuming that all households face the same relative prices. We
take as observable characteristics the number of men, women, boys and girls in each
household, as well as the logarithm of total household size. We also include a dummy
indicator which takes the value one for rural households. This allows for possible
differences in the the αi taste parameters in equations (5) across rural and urban
households (i.e., αi for urban households; αi + δi,rural for rural households).
Table 2: Estimates of expenditure system assuming a single market. Controls include
a rural dummy; the numbers of boys, girls, men, and women in household; and the
log of household size. Figures in parentheses are estimated standard errors.
βi αi Rural Boys Girls Men Women log Hsize
Passion Fruits 0.77∗∗∗ 6.44∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.00 0.03 0.09∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗
(0.06) (0.19) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10)
Oranges 0.73∗∗∗ 5.78∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ −0.00 0.11∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.07) (0.25) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.13)
Coffee 0.64∗∗∗ 4.67∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ 0.05 0.01 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ −0.06
(0.09) (0.24) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.13)
Other Fruits 0.63∗∗∗ 5.89∗∗∗ 0.04 0.07∗∗∗ 0.03 0.10∗∗∗ 0.04 0.30∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.19) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11)
Continued on next page
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βi αi Rural Boys Girls Men Women log Hsize
Mangos 0.62∗∗∗ 5.89∗∗∗ 0.10∗ 0.00 −0.02 0.08∗∗ −0.03 0.48∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.23) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13)
Sweet Bananas 0.61∗∗∗ 5.95∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.00 0.02 0.12∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.17) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09)
Ground nuts (shelled) 0.61∗∗∗ 6.02∗∗∗ −0.01 0.08∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ −0.03
(0.06) (0.17) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10)
Bread 0.60∗∗∗ 6.61∗∗∗ −0.45∗∗∗ 0.01 0.03∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗
(0.04) (0.17) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07)
Soda 0.59∗∗∗ 7.13∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ 0.00 0.03 0.07∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06
(0.06) (0.18) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09)
Maize (cobs) 0.58∗∗∗ 5.83∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.03 0.07∗∗ 0.08∗∗ −0.03 0.43∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.22) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.11)
Fresh Milk 0.56∗∗∗ 7.00∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.14∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.16) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06)
Eggs 0.50∗∗∗ 6.23∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.02 0.09∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.16) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.08)
Cooking oil 0.50∗∗∗ 6.18∗∗∗ −0.44∗∗∗ −0.01 0.01 0.09∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.12) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
Goat Meat 0.50∗∗∗ 7.30∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ 0.02 0.02 0.09∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.28∗∗
(0.07) (0.18) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.12)
Tomatoes 0.49∗∗∗ 6.04∗∗∗ −0.42∗∗∗ −0.00 0.02∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
Rice 0.48∗∗∗ 6.73∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.12) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06)
Beans (fresh) 0.47∗∗∗ 6.29∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.03 0.09∗∗∗ 0.04 0.32∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.20) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.09)
Sugar 0.47∗∗∗ 6.80∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
Irish Potatoes 0.47∗∗∗ 6.67∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.14
(0.05) (0.18) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09)
Beer 0.46∗∗∗ 8.82∗∗∗ −0.46∗∗∗ 0.03 0.09∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.08 −0.34∗∗
Continued on next page
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(0.09) (0.26) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.16)
Dodo 0.46∗∗∗ 5.67∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.08
(0.04) (0.14) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06)
Beef 0.46∗∗∗ 7.54∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05)
Onions 0.45∗∗∗ 5.21∗∗∗ −0.40∗∗∗ −0.01∗ −0.00 0.08∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Cassava (fresh) 0.45∗∗∗ 6.39∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.01 0.28∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.14) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06)
Ground nuts (pounded) 0.45∗∗∗ 6.26∗∗∗ −0.02 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗
(0.04) (0.14) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
Fresh Fish 0.45∗∗∗ 7.08∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.02 0.12∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.12∗
(0.03) (0.14) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07)
Restaurant (food) 0.45∗∗∗ 8.80∗∗∗ −0.58∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.03 0.19∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ −0.41∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.21) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07)
Other Alcoholic drinks 0.44∗∗∗ 7.31∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.01 0.17∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.06
(0.07) (0.21) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09)
Pork 0.43∗∗∗ 7.25∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.02 0.09∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.16
(0.05) (0.18) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10)
Dry/Smoked fish 0.41∗∗∗ 6.53∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.02 0.12∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.19∗∗
(0.04) (0.17) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07)
Cabbages 0.40∗∗∗ 5.92∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ 0.00 0.02 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.12) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06)
Other vegetables 0.40∗∗∗ 5.66∗∗∗ −0.05 0.04∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.13∗
(0.04) (0.14) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07)
Matoke (heap) 0.39∗∗∗ 7.64∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.00 0.04 0.11∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.21) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.13)
Maize (flour) 0.39∗∗∗ 6.62∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.13) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
Restaurant (soda) 0.37∗∗∗ 7.53∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ 0.00 0.04 0.08∗∗ 0.03 −0.11
(0.07) (0.21) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.10)
Continued on next page
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Millet 0.36∗∗∗ 6.11∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.03 0.00 0.05∗ 0.05∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.18) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.09)
Chicken 0.34∗∗∗ 8.09∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.02 0.07∗∗∗ 0.04 0.20∗∗
(0.04) (0.13) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09)
Sweet Potatoes (fresh) 0.34∗∗∗ 6.49∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.13) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
Beans (dry) 0.33∗∗∗ 6.50∗∗∗ −0.01 0.03∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.11) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
Sorghum 0.33∗∗∗ 5.99∗∗∗ 0.02 −0.03 −0.07∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.09∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.20) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.12)
Sim sim 0.33∗∗∗ 6.09∗∗∗ 0.02 0.01 −0.01 0.09∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.13
(0.05) (0.17) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11)
Tea 0.31∗∗∗ 4.59∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
Salt 0.18∗∗∗ 4.18∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Cassava (dry/flour) 0.11∗∗ 6.66∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.00 0.05∗∗ −0.04∗ 0.53∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.19) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.08)
In its first column Table 2 presents estimates of the Frisch elasticities βi in de-
scending order. It’s possible to show that the product of the elasticities with the
households’ relative risk aversions yields income elasticities, but these cross-sectional
data cannot identify cardinal properties of the utility function such as risk attitudes.
However, ratios of these estimated parameters can be interpreted as ratios of income
elasticities. Thus, the most elastic goods are passion fruits followed closely by or-
anges; these have elasticities roughly twice that of millet, four times that of salt, and
six times that of dry cassava. These orderings of elasticities seem consistent with
informal descriptions of what goods are more desired by Ugandan consumers.
All estimated elasticities are positive; thus, there is no evidence that any of these
goods is inferior, with demand increasing as log λ decreases. Standard errors for these
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elasticities are obtained via a block bootstrap (Horowitz 2003).10 The overall fit of
the demand system measured via the R2 statistic is 0.65, which compares favorably
to the fit achieved by other full-rank demand systems such as the EASI demand
system of Lewbel and Pendakur (2009), and is considerably better than the fits of the
AIDS, QUAIDS, or Rotterdam demand systems estimated by Decoster, Vermeulen,
et al. (1998).
If all values of βi were equal, preferences would be homothetic, and the rank of the
demand system would be one. Further, as observed above, the rank r of the demand
system for these goods is equal to the number of distinct values of βi. To determine
the rank, we adapt a machine-learning tool advocated by Pelleg, Moore, et al. (2000)
involving the solution of a set of k-means problems for k less than the number of
goods, and the selection of r using the Bayesian Information Criterion; see Appendix
C for details. This procedure leads to the inference that the rank of the demand
system is at least four. One way of thinking about the demand system having rank
four is that the data are telling us that we would need at least four different price
indices to measure how changes in total expenditures effect household welfare (Lewbel
1991). A corollary is that any welfare measure that uses only one price index (such
as ‘real’ total expenditures) cannot account properly for the welfare effects of changes
in relative prices.
The second column of Table 2 gives estimates of αi, where αi is the preference
parameter introduced in Assumption 1. With homothetic utility (i.e., βi = β for
all i) the αi parameters would be proportional to the expenditure share of good i,
and Frisch, income, and price elasticities would be constant across all goods. In our
non-homothetic case expenditure shares depend on the parameters αi, elasticities
βi, and prices. The parameters αi vary positively with expenditure share, and are
normalized so as to be equal to mean log expenditures in our first round of data.
Estimated standard errors for these parameters are simply equal to the standard
deviation of residuals in 2005 divided by the square root of the number of observed
positive expenditures in that year.
The third column of the table reports estimates of the effect of being a rural rather
than an urban household. Associated standard errors are clustered by round, as are
the standard errors associated with other household characteristics (Arellano 1987).
The effect of being ‘rural’ is negative and significant for all but a few goods, consistent
10. We’ve also computed standard errors by calculating the inter-quartile range of the bootstrapped
estimates, and scaling these up under the hypothesis of normality to provide an estimate of standard
errors which is more robust to outliers; both estimators deliver very similar results.
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with the fact that total food expenditures are roughly 12% less than in urban areas.
A handful of exceptions stand out: maize (cobs and flour), beans (fresh), Irish and
sweet potatoes, cassava (both fresh and dried), millet, and salt expenditures are all
significantly greater for rural households, other things equal.
The next several columns indicate how expenditures vary with household size and
composition. Here we’ve included the log of household size, but also a count of the
number of boys, girls, women, and men in the household. This allows for variation in
expenditures to respond to household composition, but in a way which also allows for
varying returns to scale. The reported coefficient on the logarithm of household size
has the interpretation of an elasticity, while the coefficients on counts of boys, girls,
men, and women are semi-elasticities. Adding a man to the household (holding total
household size constant) has the largest effect on expenditures for beer, restaurant
food, other alcoholic drinks, and coffee. Similarly, adding a women has the largest
effects on shelled groundnuts, oranges, and coffee. For most goods the addition of
an adult has a larger effect on household expenditures than does the addition of a
child: if we take a simple average of semi-elasticities across goods we obtain 0.03
for boys, 0.02 for girls, 0.09 for men, and 0.06 for women. We can further identify
particular “adult goods” where the difference in semi-elasticities between adults and
children are greatest, such as coffee, soda, onions, eggs, bread, and food consumed
in restaurants. But adult-child differences are smaller for staples such as millet, rice,
and beans, and are even reversed for starchy staples such as maize, cassava, and sweet
potatoes. There are also a handful of goods which seem to be differentially preferred
by females: goods for which point estimates of elasticities are greater for women than
for men, and for girls than for boys, are passion fruit, soda, “other vegetables”, and
shelled groundnuts.
6.2. Validation: Estimated Aggregate Shares versus Mean Shares. In Figure
1 we used data on observed expeditures to produce a plot of a statistic equal to the
logarithm of aggregate shares minus the logarithm of mean shares, ordered by the
size of the statistic in 2005, and observed that the pattern observed in that figure
could not be generated by any demand system featuring homothetic preferences.
The question naturally arises: is the non-homothetic demand system we’ve esti-
mated here capable of delivering the pattern of expenditure shares pictured in Figure
1?
This is a challenging test, because although we’ve used the observed data to es-
timate the demand system, our estimation procedure is designed to fit conditional
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expectations of log expenditures to the data, while the shares statistic we’ve con-
structed is built using logs of means and sums of expenditures. Jensen’s inequality
alone implies that our ability to match the share statistics will depend not only on
the estimated equation, but also on the distribution of residuals.
Let hi(p, λ, z) = E(log xi|p, λ, z). Assume that the residuals ejit in the estimating
equation (7) are independent and identically normally distributed for each good,
with mean zero and variance σ2i . Then a simple estimator of E(x
j
it|pt, λjt , zjt ) is
exp(hi(pˆt, λˆjt , zjt )+σˆ2i /2), where σˆ2i is the maximum likelihood estimate of the variance
of the residuals for good i, and where pˆt and λˆjt are estimates of price indices and λ
as described in Section 4.
We next simply substitute our estimates xˆjit into the expression defining the statis-
tics ρi, and plot the values of these statistics predicted by our model of demand and
estimates of prices and log λ. The result is picture in the left hand panel of Figure 2.
The left panel of Figure 2 reproduces Figure 1, except with predicted rather than
actual shares. The general pattern evidencing non-quasi-homotheticity is readily ap-
parent. But beyond this, the ρi statistics calculated using our predicted expenditures
have a Spearman correlation coefficient of 0.97 with statistics calculated using the
observed data. The right-hand panel of Figure 2 provides a scatter plot of observed
vs. predicted values of the statistic, along with a 45 degree line. The scatterplot
confirms the remarkable success of our demand system at reproducing even patterns
in the data that our estimator wasn’t designed to fit.
6.3. Validation: Testing for Selection Bias from Missing Data. Earlier we
described an approach to diagnosing selection problems that might be created by
having missing or zero expenditures in our data; details are given in Appendix A.
The idea is to estimate elasticities and log λs via a singular value decomposition of
a residual matrix as described above, and then to re-estimate after augmenting this
matrix with residuals that contain information about which observations are missing.
If selection is important, then these estimates should be different.
Figure 3 gives an informal representation of the outcome of such a test, in the form
of two scatter plots. The plot on the left shows the estimates of the βi obtained
in Table 2, versus the same vector obtained when we augment the residuals in (7)
with the residuals from a regression of a missing indicator on the same right-hand
side variables. Our estimates of elasticities are basically unchanged, save for small
difference in scale. The plot on the right does the same thing, but for estimates
of the log λjt . As is evident from the figure, the relationships are quite tight, with
34
Figure 3. Test for selection bias. Scatterplots of βi and log λ esti-
mated with and without information on missing values.
no discernable evidence of selection bias, and almost no change in orderings (the
Spearman correlation coefficients are respectively 1.00 and 0.99).
7. Estimates of log λ and Welfare Effects of the Food Price Crisis
In this section we give a characterization of the values of the IMUEs (log λ) we’ve
obtained for every observed household. One convenient way to look for variation
in these measures is to see how the distribution of these varies across years. As it
happens there were some large aggregate shocks within the timeframe covered by
our sample, with an approximate doubling of food prices in 2008 (the “food price
crisis”, Abbott and Borot de Battisti (2011)), and a subsequent recession. We mea-
sure changes in the distribution of log λ in the face of these shocks, and discuss the
consequences for rates of poverty. We find that both shocks are associated with large
increases in poverty rates. While perhaps this does not seem surprising, it is sharply
at odds with conventional approaches to the measurement of poverty, which interpret
sharply increased food expenditures as evidence of improved welfare. Going beyond
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measurement of poverty rates, we find evidence that these aggregate shocks are also
associated with increases in households’ relative risk aversion.
7.1. Estimates of log λ. The central aim of this paper is to extract measures of
household-level welfare from data on consumption expenditures. Our approach uses
information from expenditures themselves to separately identify changes in price levels
from improvements in welfare. In contrast, the conventional way to do this is to
construct the sum of expenditures on non-durable consumption and services, and then
to make comparisons over time by deflating this total by a single price index obtained
from some other source. It’s well known that this is only justified if preferences are
homothetic. Both our evidence (aggregate and mean shares are different for the
same good; estimated values of βi differ significantly across goods) and the stubborn
empirical fact of Engel’s Law rule out homotheticity, so the conventional approach
must be invalid in principle. An analysis of the episode of the 2008 food price crisis
shows the severe problems the conventional approach can also have in practice.
Figure 4 presents histograms of the estimated log λ for each round of data. The
mean and standard deviation of the distribution in the first year are normalized to
zero and one, respectively; these normalizations suffice to identify not only the vector
of elasticities β but also the distribution of log λ in subsequent years, which can
otherwise vary in unrestricted ways, reflecting changes in the distribution of welfare
relative to the base year.
So what can we say about changes in welfare in Uganda over this period? First,
note that the average expenditure share for food in Uganda over this period exceeded
60%, so most households were quite sensitive to changes in food prices. Second, note
that the food price crisis led to large increases in prices that peaked shortly before
the second survey we have, in 2009, but food prices in our 2009 data were still much
higher than in 2005.11 Of particular note is that of most staple starches (maize, millet,
potatoes, sweet potatoes, cassava) had nominal median prices twice as high in 2009
as in 2005. Such large price increases weren’t confined to staple foods the average
increase (across different kinds of food) in median prices was 96%, and no foods
decreased in price; broadly speaking nominal food prices doubled from 2005 2009.
If nominal food prices doubled, what happened to nominal expenditures on food?
These increased, as one would expect for a neccessity, but by only 58% for the average
household. Thus, either quantities of food consumed fell by roughly 40% or there
11. See also confirmation from Benson, Mugarura, and Wanda (2008) that food prices in Uganda
increased dramatically during the food price crisis.
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Figure 4. Distribution of log λ by Year.
were dietary shifts toward less expensive food. Both of these sorts of changes are
evident in our data. Average quantities were lower in 2009 than in 2005 for about
two-thirds of all foods. Bread consumption in 2009 was 25% of its level in 2005. Beer
consumption fell by 23%, while consumption of “other alcoholic drinks” increased by
35%. Maize and cassava consumption fell by 10 25%, while consumption of matoke
(a local starchy staple which experienced only modestly higher prices) increased by
38%. This matches contemporary news reports of near famine conditions in parts of
the country, and is consistent with the rightward shift of 0.29 standard deviations
in the distribution of log λ seen in Figure 4. The mean value of log λ has some nice
features as an aggregate welfare measure; adopting it we would say, roughly, that from
2005 to 2009 we observed a 29% reduction in welfare for this population, followed by
a two percent improvement in 2010, with no subsequent change in the mean of the
distribution in 2011.
Prices go up by more than expenditures from 2005 9; there’s a reduction in welfare
captured by our measure. This all seems sensible. But how does it compare with
conventional accounts of changes in poverty, which simply deflate total expenditures
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by a single price index? Since the rank of the demand system is at least four, division
by any single index can’t be correct, but different single indices can be wrong in
different ways.
Relation of log λ to poverty measures. We follow what is perhaps the most obvious
approach. The Ugandan Bureau of Statistics calculates a consumer price index (CPI)
using methods which generally follow standard international procedures (Intersecre-
tariat Working Group on Price Statistics 2004). In the Ugandan case, this involved
using the 2005 expenditure data to construct weights similar in construction to the
“aggregate shares” described in 5 (though for a coarser aggregation of goods). These
data on shares are combined with data from monthly surveys of urban prices to con-
struct a Laspeyres index.12 For the critical period of 2005 2009 the CPI increased
by 44%. Using this index leads to the inference that real per capita expenditures
increased by about 24%, or about 0.25 standard deviations. This about the same
magnitude as the change in log λ, but in the wrong direction!
Consider the effects of this on measures of headcount poverty; these are summarized
in Figure 5. In each year we plot a kernel density estimate of the distribution of log
expenditures (deflated by the CPI) on the right, and the distribution of − log λ on
the left (we’ve changed the sign so rightward shifts in both cases imply improvements
in welfare). The two distributions shift in opposite directions not only in 2005 09, as
noted above, but also in 2010 11.
The World Bank’s online PovCalNet uses the same underlying datasets for cal-
culating welfare statistics as do we, and recommends a PPP-adjustment of 946.89
(Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula 2009). Using this adjustment and the recommended
$1.90 poverty line, the World Bank’s figure for headcount poverty in 2005 is 55.4%.
We use this figure to pin down a poverty line of 11.27 in (log) 2005 Ugandan shillings,
and what we might call a corresponding log λ-poverty line of −0.15 (determined by
the fact that 55.4% of the population has values of log λ which exceed −0.15).
What happens to poverty headcounts if we use our methods? Fixing the poverty
line so that 55.4% of the population is below the poverty line in 2005, changes in
the distribution of log λ across years imply an increase in the poverty rate to 69%
in 2009. By 2010 the mean of the distribution of log λ shifts back by 13%, almost
back to the level of the base year, and the headcount poverty rate falls to 56%. The
subsequent effects of a recession (Brunori, Palmisano, and Peragine 2015) slightly
12. This broad description omits important details; see Uganda Office of the Auditor General
(2014).
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Figure 5. Changes in distributions of − log λ and deflated log ex-
penditures over time, with implied headcount poverty statistics.
shifts and changes the shape of the distribution, resulting in an increase in headcount
poverty to 59%.
The conventional calculations tell a very different story. The same CPI adjustment
that leads to an incorrect estimate of real expenditures is also incorrect for headcount
poverty measures. Over the period in which food prices doubled the conventional ap-
proach suggests that poverty fell by half. The methods agree that poverty fell sharply
from 2009 to 2010, but then during Uganda’s recession of 2010 11 the conventional
calculation suggests a further dramatic fall in poverty, to 12%.
Using some index other than the CPI would yield different implications for head-
count poverty. The World Bank seems to use an index which is CPI divided by
aggregate per capita consumption expenditures, for example (though details of their
calculations are not public). One sometimes encounters the recommendation that one
should construct a Laspeyres index using the expenditure shares for households at
the poverty line. The advice to use a single index misses the essential point that the
demands and expenditure shares themselves vary in a way that can’t be explained
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without using at least four different price indices. Though one could trivially devise
a single price index that yielded the same poverty calculations as our approach, that
price index would not work for any other realization of prices other than that observed
ex post.
7.2. Measuring Heterogeneity in Risk Aversion. In this section we explore the
connection between λ and total expenditures. The IMUE λ is decreasing in total
expenditures x by construction, but it’s also of interest to know the rate at which
it’s decreasing. This leads to consideration of the expenditure elasticity of λ, or
ω = ∂ log λ/∂ log x. This is what Frisch called the household’s “money flexibility,”
and provides information on the responsiveness of the welfare measure λ to changes
in expenditures. Under a cardinalization of utility which makes λ the MUE then −ω
can also be interpreted as relative risk aversion.
In a model which is nearly a special case of ours, Chiappori et al. (2014) adopt
this cardinalization and estimate heterogeneous relative risk aversion using data from
Thailand. In addition to the cardinalization they adopt two key identifying assump-
tions. First, they assume that for a given household j all good elasticities βi = βj
are common, so that preferences are homothetic (but can vary across households).
Second, they assume that there’s full insurance, so that a given household’s λ is fixed
over time.
In this section we show that it’s possible to estimate risk aversion under gener-
ally weaker assumptions than those adopted by Chiappori et al. (2014). That paper
assumes that risk attitudes differ across households because homothetic preferences
differ across households. In contrast, we assume that households have common prefer-
ences, but risk aversion varies with resources because preferences are non-homothetic.
We entirely drop the very strong assumption of full insurance. If we maintain the Chi-
appori et al. (2014) cardinalization then we can estimate the distribution of relative
aversions; if we weaken the cardinalization assumption to allow a flexible parametric
class of regular transformations of momentary utility we can estimate the distribution
of relative risk aversions up to a location parameter.
We begin by exploring the relationship between ω and λ, where no cardinalization
is required. The relationship is illustrated in Figure 6, where λ is on the horizontal
axis. The central plotted line offers calculations of ω given the point estimates of αi
and the βi elasticities given in Table 2; the shaded region allows each point estimate
to vary by plus or minus one standard error, giving some sense of how sensitive our
estimates are to imprecisely estimated Frisch elasticities. From the figure, one can
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Figure 6. Calculated relative risk aversions versus λ. Varying all
estimates of βi by plus or minus two standard errors yields the shaded
area.
see that this elasticity is decreasing in λ, and so increasing in total expenditures. The
figure illustrates the point that the utility of wealthier households is less sensitive to
variation in total food expenditures than is the utility of poorer households.
Knowing ω is what we need for estimating within-period Engel curves. If we adopt
the same cardinalization as Chiappori et al. (2014) then λ is the MUE. If preferences
are also von Neumann-Morgenstern, then −ω can also be interpreted as the house-
hold’s relative risk aversion. If in addition utility is time separable with exponential
discounting, then its negative reciprocal is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
With the cardinalization, the elasticity ω gives us a link between λ and risk aversion
(or more generally the curvature of the momentary utility function). However, with-
out the cardinalization this isn’t enough the purely cross-sectional demand behavior
we observe which identifies λ and ω simply can’t non-parametrically identify the mo-
mentary utility function, because any monotonic transformation of utility (say M(U))
would generate exactly the same intra-temporal demands.
Let us replace the cardinalization assumption with the weaker assumption that
all households have momentary utility identified up to a common regular twice
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continuously-differentiable transformation M . Then the “true” (momentary) indi-
rect utility function is not V (p, x), but V ∗(p, x) = M(V (p, x)). We’ve estimated
λ = ∂V/∂x, but if utility is M(U) then the marginal utility of expenditures isn’t
λ, but rather λM ′(U), where M ′ is the derivative of the monotone transformation.
Without knowledge of the transformation M we’re limited in what we can say about
risk aversion, or intertemporal substitution.
However, with modest additional assumptions it’s possible to estimate the distri-
bution of households’ relative risk aversions, up to an unknown location parameter.
Recall that the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion for a household with
indirect utility V ∗(x, p) is given by
RRA(p, x) = −x∂
2V ∗/∂x2
∂V ∗/∂x
.
With V ∗(p, x) = M(V (x, p)), we have ∂V ∗/∂x = M ′(V (p, x))λ(x, p) (recalling that
λ = ∂V/∂x). Differentiating again and applying the chain rule allows us to write
RRA(p, x) = −∂ log λ(p, x)
∂ log x − x
M ′′
M ′
λ(x, p)
The quantities in the first term on the right-hand side are the relative risk aversions
shown in Figure 7. The second term involves the first and second derivatives of the
unknown transformation M . A judicious parameterization of M is
M(U) = U
1−σ − 1
1− σ ;
this matches related assumptions used by MaCurdy (1983) or Browning, Deaton, and
Irish (1985). With this parameterization of M we have the first term −xλM ′′
M ′ ≈ σ to
a first order approximation, so that we have
RRA(p, x) ≈ σ − ω(p, x).
This then allows us to identify households’ relative risk aversions up to the unknown
constant σ.
Results of calculating households’ values of relative risk aversion in different years
are shown in the densities estimated in Figure 7. The global mean is 1.83, with a
standard deviation of 0.05. However, there are significant shifts in the distribution
over time, corresponding to shifts in the distribution of the log λ. In 2005, the mean
is 1.82. The increase in IMUEs in 2009 is associated with a statistically significant
increase in mean relative risk aversion to 1.84; a (significant) fall in 2010 to 1.832;
and finally rather large shift during the recession year of 2011 to 1.85. Households
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Figure 7. Distribution of estimated relative risk aversion in different
years. Standard deviation of pooled estimates is 0.09; kurtosis is 0.22.
are assumed to have identical βi parameters and to face identical prices, so differences
in risk aversion within a period are driven entirely by differences in log λ; differences
in risk aversion across periods are due to a combination of differences in log λ and
changes in relative prices. The estimated values of relative risk aversion in Figure 7
are well within the range of plausible relative risk aversions.
The finding that households in Uganda have heterogeneous relative risk aversions
echoes the findings of Chiappori et al. (2014) for households in Thailand. However,
their identification strategy assumes homothetic utility and relies on a maintained
hypothesis that households are fully insured. We are able to avoid these strong
assumptions entirely; the analogous assumptions which allow us to identify the dis-
tribution of relative risk aversions (up to an unknown location) are just the much
weaker requirements that elasticities are constant (but may vary across goods) and
that the household maximizes utility within the period subject to a budget constraint.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we’ve outlined some of the key methodological ingredients needed in
a recipe to estimate a simple measure of household welfare. Rather than the usual
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approach of trying to measure total expenditures, we instead focus on the information
available from the composition of a household’s consumption portfolio.
We establish that if differences in household welfare can be inferred from differ-
ences in relative consumption of goods across otherwise similar households, then any
globally regular demand system must take a particular semi-parametric form we call
a Constant Frisch Elasticity (CFE) demand system.
The CFE demand system features highly flexible Engel curves, and a measure
of household welfare which is closely related to the household’s marginal utility of
expenditures. We devise a simple estimator which allows us to estimate both critical
demand parameters as well as household-specific measures of welfare we call log λ.
The methods described are theoretically coherent, in the sense that they’re con-
sistent with a particular utility-derived demand system. Further, our approach lends
itself to straightforward statistical inference and hypothesis testing, and is very parsi-
monious in its data requirements. In particular, our methods are designed for use by
an ignorant econometrician: they will work even if we observe only expenditures on
some goods, and some household characteristics. Observing total expenditures and
prices is entirely unnecessary.
In an application of these methods we use four rounds of data from Uganda. We
focus on food expenditures in this dataset, estimating a system of demands for 44
different kinds of food. We estimate both household log λ and Frischian elasticity
parameters from this expenditure system, in addition to other demand parameters.
We use the estimated distributions of log λ over time to characterize changes in the
poverty rate related to the 2008 food price crisis, and to a 2010 11 “great recession.”
Our results contrast sharply with other accounts, which, given evidence of increased
food expenditures, concluded that poverty had fallen sharply during both episodes.
A separate analysis allows us to characterize the distribution of households’ relative
risk aversions. This distribution is identified only up to a location parameter, but we
find convincing evidence of heterogeneity, and evidence that both the food price crisis
and the 2010 11 recession increased not only rates of poverty, but also increased the
average households’ sensitivity to risk variation in food expenditures, as measured by
relative risk aversion.
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Appendix A. For Online Publication: Issues with Missing Data
We consider two issues related to the possibility that certain item expenditures
may be zero or missing for some households in our dataset. The first is a practical
issue, having to do with the calculation of the singular value decomposition (SVD)
of a matrix when some of the elements of that matrix are missing. The resolution of
this problem involves relying just on observed data. This is clearly okay if the data is
“missing at random” (Little and Rubin 2002), but if there’s selection on unobservables
then the matter is less clear. Thus, our second issue involves obtaining conditions
under which selection doesn’t compromise our SVD calculation.
A.1. A method for computing the singular value decomposition of random
matrices with missing elements. Consider a random matrix X having a con-
tinuous distribution with support over some subset of Rn×m and a second random
matrix M of the same dimension with elements either 1 or 0. Assume without loss
of generality that n ≤ m, and that the matrix X is “low rank” in the sense that its
rank is strictly less than n. We observe only a matrix A = X ⊗M , where ⊗ is the
Hadamard product. Any zero element of A is said to be “missing;” we assume that
both the row and column sums of M are greater than zero.
We wish to construct a matrix Xˆ close to X in the Frobenius norm. If we assume
that the rank of X is some known number r then we have the compact singular value
decomposition of the matrix X = U ∗Σ∗V ∗>, with U ∗ n× r, Σ∗ r× r and diagonal,
and V ∗ m× r.
Our strategy involves first using the m columns of A to estimate the n× r matrix
U ∗Σ∗. We construct a matrix
P = mAA>  (MM>),
where  is the Hadamard (element-by-element) division operator. P can be inter-
preted as the matrix product AA> scaled to ignore zero elements; note that it’s
positive semi-definite by construction. Then the square root of the eigenvalues of P
is an estimator for the diagonal matrix Σ∗, while the corresponding eigenvectors U
estimate U ∗.
With UΣ in hand we proceed row by row to construct an estimate of V ∗: suppose
a is a column vector from the matrix A, and that A has the compact singular value
decomposition UΣV >. The vector a can be partitioned into two parts y and x, while
a matrix UΣx can be constructed by selecting just the rows of UΣ corresponding
to the x elements of the vector a. Then the row of V ∗ corresponding to a can be
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estimated by
v = (UΣx)+x,
where the + operator here indicates the Penrose-Moore pseudo-inverse. Iterating over
all m columns of A then yields the desired matrix Xˆ.
A.2. Effects of non-random selection. Let (X,M) be corresponding columns of
the random matrices X and M , each an n-dimensional random variable, where X
has realizations x, and M observable realizations m. If X and M are independent
we say that the data is “missing at random” and the methods describe above deliver
what we want, but otherwise there may be a selection problem. We want to establish
conditions on the joint distribution F (X,M) which ensure that E(UΣ) = U ∗Σ∗,
provided the columns of X and M are uncorrelated across households.
To this end, we modestly extend an idea from the psychometric literature due to
Meredith (1993) (Theorem 5). This idea in turn can be thought of as extending the
usual result from the program evaluation literature that selection on observables need
not compromise consistent estimation (Heckman and Robb 1986). Instead of assum-
ing that selection depends only on a set of observable variables, we allow selection to
depend on a set of latent variables. (This also generalizes the idea from fixed effects
estimation in unbalanced panels that selection isn’t a problem if the probability of a
household being missing in a given period can be “explained” by a fixed effect.)
In particular, let W be a p-dimensional latent variable with realizations w that
underlies X; and let L be an q-dimensional random variable with realizations l that
underlies M .
A collection of functions si(l) comprise a selection rule that gives the marginal
probability that mi = 1 for an individual with attributes l, i = 1, . . . , n. We adopt
the following assumptions:
Assumption 4. (1) The conditional distribution of X given w is non-degenerate,
and first and second moments exist;
(2) W and L are not independent; and
(3) The joint probability distribution of M is assumed to be conditionally indepen-
dent across i, so we have
s(m|L) =
n∏
i=1
si(L)mi(1− si(L))1−mi .
53
The first assumption is standard. The second is necessary for knowledge of w to
tells us something about the probability of selection. The third could perhaps be re-
laxed, but allowing conditional dependence in selection would considerably complicate
estimation.
Now, let Es(g(X)|w, l) denote the conditional expectation and Vars(g(X)|w, l) the
conditional covariance matrix of g(X) conditional on w given the selection rule s(m|l)
for any Lebesgue-measurable function g. Otherwise expectations and covariances
E(g(X)|w, l) and Var(g(X)|w, l) correspond to the population distribution F (x,w, l)
without any selection.
Proposition 4. Given Assumption 4, if E(X|w, l) = E(X|w) and Var(X|w, l) =
Var(X|w) for all (w, l) then Es(X|w, l) = E(X|w) and Vars(X|w, l) = Var(X|w) for
all w, all selection functions s, and all l such that si(l) > 0 for some i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. Let F (x,w, l,m) be the joint distribution of (x,w, l,m) in the population; then
the selected joint distribution is given by the Lebesgue integral
Fs(x,w, l) =
∫
s(m|l)dF (x,w, l)/
∫
s(m|l)dF (l)
for all (x ⊗m,w, l) such that si(l) > 0 for some i = 1, . . . , n, and then Fs(x|w, l) =
F (x|w, l) over the same set; thus Es(g(X)|w, l) = E(g(X)|w, l) = E(g(X)|w). The
first part of the proposition is then established by taking g(X) = X, while the second
is established taking g(X) = g(X|w) = E(XX>|w)−E(X|w)E(X|w)> for any w. 
The key to the result is that the factors which determine selection directly affect
X only via their interaction with the latent variables W ; this is related to but weaker
than a condition sometimes called “missing at random conditional on X” (Wedel and
Kamakura 2001).
A special case which satisfies the conditions of Proposition 4 occurs when the
selection rule doesn’t depend on L at all, so that we have s(m|L) = s(m|L′) for
all (L,L′). In this case data are “missing at random”, in the lexicon of Little and
Rubin (2002), and we are able to obtain unbiased estimates of (U ∗,Σ∗,V ∗). In the
more general case in which the selection rule varies with L but the conditions of the
proposition are satisfied we can expect to obtain unbiased estimates only of (U ∗,Σ∗),
as the sample of households for which we observe expenditures may be systematically
different from the population.
A.3. A simple test for selection bias. Our case is related to the case in which
there’s attrition in a panel of households, but in which the factors that cause attrition
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can be captured by fixed effects. In our case suppose that we’re using only a single
cross-section, with a large number of households J and a smaller fixed number of
goods n; now the fact that expenditures on some goods are zero or missing is just
like observations for some households being missing in the unbalanced panel case.
The idea for fixed effects panel estimation is that the selection process depends on
fixed household characteristics. Our latent variables aren’t household fixed effects,
but instead latent interactions which capture variation in prices (ait) and household
resources (log λjt), but these are also exactly the features we might be concerned
would lead to selection problems were we estimating demands for a single good, as
in Deaton and Irish (1984). If, after conditioning on these, expenditures are zero
or missing simply because of the timing of stocking decisions or some other random
censoring process then we can expect our linear model with interactive latent variables
ait and βi log λjt to deliver consistent results, much as in the case of Ahn, Lee, and
Schmidt (2001).
Here we describe a simple test of the central conditions required in Proposition 4.
Suppose that we have X = WA+UX , L = WB +UL, and M = LC +UM . Then we
have
[X,M ] = [WA,LC] + [UX ,UL]
= W [A,BC] + [UX ,ULC +UM ].
Under the null hypothesis that E(X|W,L) = E(X|W ), a singular value decomposition
of [X,M ] allows us to estimate both W and A. On the other hand, if the hypothesis
doesn’t hold and W is not orthogonal to ULC+UM then the SVD of this augmented
matrix will estimate quantities which depend on ULC +UM .
In the application of this paper the matrix X is obtained from the residuals of
(7), delivering a matrix which is orthogonal to household characteristics and good-
time effects. Thus, we similarly filter the dummy variables M by regressing these
on the same right-hand side, and using estimated residuals from this regression. A
maintained assumption of our application is that the rank of the matrix W is one;
thus the test proposed here becomes a question of whether the decomposition of the
augmented matrix yields significantly different estimates of the rank one UΣ and
rank one V what we obtain when we simply decompose X.
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Appendix B. For Online Publication: Food items across rounds and
aggregation
Food codes and items are fairly consistently recorded across rounds, but not per-
fectly so; further, some are clearly sensibly treated as substitutes (e.g., different size
bunches of matoke). Other food items are treated separately in some rounds (e.g.,
“Watermelon” in 2010 and 2011) but assigned to an aggregate (e.g., “Other Fruits”)
in other rounds, necessitating the use of the coarser aggregate to achieve consistency
across rounds. Table B.1 gives a precise accounting of all codes and aggregation. We
supply a “Preferred Label” column and an “Aggregate Label.” The “preferred” label
eliminates minor differences in spelling or word usage across rounds (e.g., “Matoke”
versus “matooke”). The “Aggregate Label” need not be unique; expenditures for all
items with the same “Aggregate Label” will be summed together, yielding what we
call a “minimally-aggregated” set of data of food expenditures. This minimal aggre-
gation confines itself to combining expenditures on different food items which seem
to obviously be very close substitutes. Sometimes these differences are just in units:
we aggregate “clusters” and “heaps” of Matoke, for example. Othertimes the form of
the good is somewhat different: fresh and dried cassava are aggregated, for example.
Table B.1: Labels for various food items in different rounds, with “Preferred” and
“Aggregate” labels.
Code Preferred Label Aggregate Label
100 Matoke (??) Matoke
101 Matoke (bunch) Matoke
102 Matoke (cluster) Matoke
103 Matoke (heap) Matoke
104 Matoke (other) Matoke
105 Sweet Potatoes (fresh) Sweet Potatoes
106 Sweet Potatoes (dry) Sweet Potatoes
107 Cassava (fresh) Cassava
108 Cassava (dry/flour) Cassava
109 Irish Potatoes Irish Potatoes
110 Rice Rice
111 Maize (grains) Maize
Continued on next page
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Code Preferred Label Aggregate Label
112 Maize (cobs) Maize
113 Maize (flour) Maize
114 Bread Bread
115 Millet Millet
116 Sorghum Sorghum
117 Beef Beef
118 Pork Pork
119 Goat Meat Goat Meat
120 Other Meat Other Meat
121 Chicken Chicken
122 Fresh Fish Fresh Fish
123 Dry/Smoked fish Dry/Smoked fish
124 Eggs Eggs
125 Fresh Milk Fresh Milk
126 Infant Formula Infant Formula
127 Cooking oil Cooking oil
128 Ghee Ghee
129 Margarine, Butter, etc Margarine, Butter, etc
130 Passion Fruits Passion Fruits
131 Sweet Bananas Sweet Bananas
132 Mangoes Mangoes
133 Oranges Oranges
134 Other Fruits Other Fruits
135 Onions Onions
136 Tomatoes Tomatoes
137 Cabbages Cabbages
138 Dodo Dodo
139 Other vegetables Other Vegetables
140 Beans (fresh) Beans
141 Beans (dry) Beans
142 Ground nuts (in shell) Ground nuts
Continued on next page
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Code Preferred Label Aggregate Label
143 Ground nuts (shelled) Ground nuts
144 Ground nuts (pounded) Ground nuts
145 Peas Peas
146 Sim sim Sim sim
147 Sugar Sugar
148 Coffee Coffee
149 Tea Tea
150 Salt Salt
151 Soda Soda
152 Beer Beer
153 Other Alcoholic drinks Other Alcoholic drinks
154 Other drinks Other drinks
155 Cigarettes Cigarettes
156 Other Tobacco Other Tobacco
157 Restaurant (food) Restaurant (food)
158 Restaurant (soda) Soda
159 Restaurant (beer) Beer
160 Other juice Other juice
161 Other foods Other foods
162 Peas (dry) Peas
163 Ground nut (paste) Ground nuts
164 Green pepper Other Vegetables
165 Pumpkins Other Vegetables
166 Avocado Other Fruits
167 Carrots Other Vegetables
168 Eggplant Other Vegetables
169 Watermelon Other Fruits
170 Pineapple Other Fruits
171 Pawpaw Other Fruits
The aggregation in Table B.1 results in total of 49 different items. Most of these are
straightforward types of food, such as peas, mangoes, ground nuts, maize, or sugar.
Food consumed in restaurants is a category of its own, however, and may be thought
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of an aggregate bundle of food and services. Alcoholic beverages account for two
additional categories, “beer” and “other alcoholic drinks.” And then finally there are
two non-food categories included, “cigarettes” and “other tobacco.” Altogether there
are five categories which are explicitly undifferentiated aggregates: “other fruits”,
“other vegetables”, “other alchoholic drinks”, “other drinks”, and “other tobacco.”
Other categories may be implicitly aggregated: for example, “ground nut” includes
nuts shelled, unshelled, and made into paste. Finally, even after aggregation some of
these categories contain very few positive observations in at least some years; dropping
these yields a total of 44 categories.13
Table B.2: Aggregate and mean expenditures shares for 44 minimally aggregated
goods in selected years.
Aggregate Aggregate Mean Mean
Goods 2005 2011 2005 2011
Restaurant (food) 0.084 0.084 0.065 0.075
Sweet Potatoes (fresh) 0.076 0.068 0.083 0.080
Maize (flour) 0.072 0.081 0.086 0.090
Beef 0.065 0.067 0.051 0.053
Beans (dry) 0.062 0.068 0.079 0.087
Sugar 0.062 0.050 0.060 0.049
Fresh Milk 0.047 0.046 0.039 0.042
Cassava (dry/flour) 0.044 0.052 0.052 0.053
Cassava (fresh) 0.042 0.054 0.048 0.064
Rice 0.031 0.031 0.025 0.023
Fresh Fish 0.027 0.026 0.024 0.022
Beer 0.024 0.012 0.012 0.007
Cooking oil 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.025
Dry/Smoked fish 0.022 0.025 0.023 0.023
Chicken 0.021 0.030 0.015 0.021
Tomatoes 0.021 0.019 0.023 0.021
Other Alcoholic drinks 0.020 0.019 0.024 0.023
Continued on next page
13. Excluded goods include infant formula, butter & margarine, ghee, ground nuts, pork, other
juice, other drinks, and other meat.
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Goods 2005 2011 2005 2011
Bread 0.017 0.017 0.012 0.012
Millet 0.017 0.016 0.019 0.018
Ground nuts (pounded) 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.019
Other Fruits 0.014 0.002 0.012 0.002
Goat Meat 0.013 0.017 0.012 0.011
Maize (cobs) 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.011
Irish Potatoes 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.013
Beans (fresh) 0.013 0.017 0.015 0.020
Other vegetables 0.012 0.008 0.020 0.013
Soda 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.005
Matoke (heap) 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.008
Sorghum 0.010 0.013 0.019 0.020
Dodo 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.012
Onions 0.009 0.011 0.010 0.013
Passion Fruits 0.008 0.004 0.006 0.002
Ground nuts (shelled) 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.007
Mangos 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.005
Sweet Bananas 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.004
Pork 0.007 0.011 0.006 0.010
Salt 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.009
Eggs 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004
Cabbages 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007
Restaurant (soda) 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004
Tea 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.004
Sim sim 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.006
Oranges 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
Coffee 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
B.1. Aggregate and Mean Shares.
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Appendix C. For Online Publication: Estimating the rank of the
demand system
Using the fact that our estimates are normally distributed, we can evaluate the
likelihood that the rank of the system is k ≤ n by solving the k-means problem
Ck = min
b∈Rk
[min
k
|βi − bk|]>i V −1[min
k
|βi − bk|]i,
where V is the estimated covariance matrix of our estimates of β. Note that under
the null hypothesis that the rank of the matrix is k then the statistic Ck is distributed
χ2n−k. We compute the corresponding likelihood Lk. Using the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC)
BICk = k log n− 2 logLk
gives in our case an estimate of rank four for the demand system. Figure 8 presents
the result of these calculations; one can see that the minimum is achieved at k = 4,
with b = (0.18, 0.36, 0.47, 0.62).
Figure 8. Using the BIC criterion to estimate the rank of the demand system.
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